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The Arabic Sea Battle:
al-Farabi on the Problem of Future Contingents
by Peter  Adamson (London)
Abstract: Ancient commentators like Ammonius and Boethius tried to solve Aris-
totle’s “sea battle argument” in On Interpretation 9 by saying that statements about
future contingents are “indefinitely” true or false. They were followed by al-Farabi in
his commentary on On Interpretation. The article sets out two possible interpre-
tations of what “indefinitely” means here, and shows that al-Farabi actually has both
conceptions: one applied in his interpretation of Aristotle, and another that he is
forced into by the problem of divine foreknowledge. It also explains the relevance of
al-Farabi’s remarks as a link between the non-statistical modal theories of Philo and
Avicenna.
Few passages in the Aristotelian corpus have provoked such intense
commentary and scrutiny as the ninth chapter of On Interpretation, in
which Aristotle presents an argument for determinism using the fa-
mous example of a sea battle. Roughly, the problem is this: if it is true
now that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then it is already “settled”
that the sea battle will occur tomorrow. Thus it is necessary that there
be a sea battle. Since the same line of reasoning may be applied to any
event, everything that happens, happens necessarily. The tradition of
commentary on this argument begins at least as early as the school of
Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the late ancient interpretation of Aris-
totle’s text has now itself become the subject of a substantial body of
secondary literature.1 Disagreements about the interpretations given by
the commentators reflect disagreements about Aristotle’s original dis-
cussion, because scholars working on Aristotle have been keen to find
in the commentators a precedent for their own preferred interpretations
of De int 9. The present paper concentrates on a treatment of the text
that comes still later in the tradition: that found in a commentary on On
1 For Alexander’s school see Sharples 1982. For later Neoplatonic treatments, see
Sorabji 1980, 91–103; Frede 1985, 42ff.; Gaskin 1995; Ammonius / Boethius
1998, with interpretive essays by Sorabji, Kretzmann and Mignucci; and Seel
2001, with interpretive essays by Seel and Mignucci (Mignucci’s contribution to
this volume is a revision of the essay from Ammonius / Boethius 1998).
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Interpretation by the tenth century philosopher al-Farabi.2 His com-
mentary is a striking example of the continuity of late Greek and early
Arabic philosophy: the section on De int 9 repeats, sometimes verbatim,
passages and interpretations still extant in the commentaries of Am-
monius and Boethius.3
In what follows we will be largely preoccupied with two ways of
understanding the solution to the sea battle problem given by the
ancient commentators. It is uncontroversial that, like most modern in-
terpreters, they see Aristotle as presenting a deterministic argument
that proceeds from the Principle of Bivalence (PB), which is that any
meaningful assertoric statement P is either true or false (this is equival-
ent to saying that either P or its antithesis Not-P is true). A statement
about the future, e.g. “there will be a sea battle tomorrow”, is then sub-
stituted for P. How the argument is supposed to work from that point
onwards is disputed. Some modern readers think that Aristotle’s deter-
minist makes an illegitimate inference from Necessarily: P or Not-P to
Necessarily: P or Necessarily: Not-P. Others think the determinist is
just supposing that truth implies necessity: if P then Nec P – and further
that Aristotle may accept this supposition, a suspicion whose initial im-
plausibility is diminished by the observation that, for Aristotle, present
2 Which has been translated, with extensive commentary, in Zimmermann 1981.
The Arabic edition for the commentary is in Kutsch and Marrow 1960, hereafter
referred to simply as Commentary. The text reproduces quite faithfully a faulty
manuscript, so numerous corrections are needed; I have adopted the readings
given in the notes of Zimmermann’s translation unless otherwise noted. The
Treatise, a short paraphrase of De int, which I shall also discuss in passing below,
is edited in Küyel-Türker 1966.
3 For Ammonius’ commentary see CAG IV.5, A. Busse (ed.), reprinted in Seel
2001. For Boethius’ see Boethius 1877. The relevant sections of both are trans-
lated in Ammonius / Boethius 1998. Zimmermann 1981 detects two separate
archetypes here, and says that there is influence on al-Farabi from both strands of
the commentary tradition. But he points out several features of his discussion of
ch. 9 that seem to relate more to the Boethian archetype (see his page xcv), which
in his view preserves more of the discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, prob-
ably by way of Porphyry. However there seem to me signs in this section of
dependence on the Ammonian archetype as well: for example, Ammonius
151.34–152.11 looks as if it stands behind Commentary 97.7–15, especially the
last sentence in each case. And as we will see below, al-Farabi’s criticism of the
“commentators” in regard to their analysis of Aristotle’s procedure in ch. 9 is di-
rected at the sort of approach we find in Ammonius but not in Boethius. Two
other ancient commentaries are close to Ammonius: an anonymous commentary
and that of Stephanus. For the latter see Stephanus 2000. For the anonymous
commentary see Tarán 1978.
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and past states of affairs obtain necessarily. In that case, since PB says
that either P or Not-P is now true, the necessity of the true antithesis
will follow.
However it is construed, the ancient commentators believe that Aris-
totle hoped to escape from the argument by admitting that antitheses
regarding future contingents are indeed either true or false – so PB, in
their view, does apply to statements regarding future contingents – but
then saying that the antitheses are not “definitely” true or false
(φρισµων«, Lat. definite), but “indefinitely” true or false. What does
this mean? There are two possibilities, both of which have found their
adherents in recent literature. For the sake of brevity I shall call them
(A) and (B):
(A) Neither statement is (yet) true, or false, but each antithesis is either-true-or-false.
In other words, the truth values are not (yet) distributed between P and Not-P. This
corresponds roughly to, and is often thought to be equivalent to, what has been
called the “Standard” or “Traditional” interpretation, which holds that Aristotle
simply denies PB in the case of statements about future contingents.4
(B) It is now the case that either P or Not-P is true, in the sense that the truth value is
already distributed. However, it is distributed in an “indefinite” way, which means
not that the truth is as it were “hovering” between the two antitheses, as (A) would
have it, but rather that the true statement is true in a way appropriate to contingent
facts, events, or states of affairs. This corresponds to a popular “Non-Standard” in-
terpretation5, which holds that Aristotle is willing to admit that if P is now true, the
event predicted by P will in fact take place. But, he will insist, things might neverthe-
less have been otherwise: P does not imply anything’s occurring necessarily, but
rather its occurring contingently.6
4 This reading of some or all the ancient commentators has been defended most
prominently by Frede, Gaskin, and Kretzmann. They all admit that (A) is equiv-
alent to a denial of PB except in its “rhetoric”, since PB as we understand it says
that P is either true or false, not either-true-or-false. However, as Gaskin says this
rhetorical difference is a pivotal one, since it allows them to insist that actually
Aristotle does accept PB (in an admittedly modified form) for all assertoric state-
ments.
5 First put forward in the modern literature by Anscombe 1956, revised version in
Moravcsik 1968, 15–33.
6 This interpretation of the commentators has been defended prominently by
Sorabji, Mignucci, and Seel. I do not here distinguish between the version of (B)
on which “indefinitely true” means nothing more than “contingently true”, and
the slightly more complicated version of (B) put forward by Mignucci. The points
given below for and against finding (B) in al-Farabi would, I think, all be valid on
either of these versions of (B).
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One clear way of putting the difference between (A) and (B) is that,
according to (B), a single statement (one half of an antithetical pair)
can be “indefinitely true” or “indefinitely false”, but not both. For (A)
by contrast, if P is “indefinitely true” this implies that it is also “indefi-
nitely false”7, and hence that Not-P is likewise both indefinitely true
and indefinitely false.
There has been as yet no full discussion of which of these interpre-
tations is to be found in al-Farabi, taking in the evidence of the entire
text. Indeed there is some confusion in the literature as to al-Farabi’s
position. This is largely the result of Nicholas Rescher’s announcement
that al-Farabi was the inventor of the “Non-Standard” interpretation
described under (B) above, which he calls the “Farabian” interpre-
tation.8 In the introduction to his translation of al-Farabi’s commen-
tary, Fritz Zimmermann stated that this was a “manifest error” on
Rescher’s part, and that in fact al-Farabi followed the ancient commen-
tators in holding that statements about the future are “indefinite” in
sense (A) above.9 In what follows I will suggest that in a sense Rescher
and Zimmermann are both right, because al-Farabi has not one, but
two solutions to the sea battle. The first solution, which he gives in
his comments on the actual lemmata of On Interpretation, is in accord-
ance with (A). But a second solution, which accords with (B), is then
given in response to the additional problem of divine foreknowledge.10
The historical implications of both solutions are significant. Al-Fara-
bi’s adoption of (A) in the commentary proper is evidence relevant
to our understanding of the ancient commentators.11 And as we will
7 As pointed out by Gaskin 1995, 155.
8 See Rescher 1963.
9 Zimmermann 1981, 79, followed by Gaskin 1995, 329–330. Talanga 1981, 307 re-
marks “Man kann zusammen mit Zimmermann mit Fug und Recht behaupten,
daß sich die ‘farabische’ Interpretation bei al-Farabi nicht finden läßt”.
10 It must be said that Zimmermann and Gaskin come out of the disagreement
somewhat better than Rescher. For one thing, if, as I argue, he was correct to find
(B) in al-Farabi, he was wrong to think that al-Farabi puts it forward as an inter-
pretation of Aristotle. For another thing it is far from clear that (B) was never put
forward prior to al-Farabi. It is also not clear on what basis Rescher ascribes (B)
to al-Farabi, though he may have al-Farabi’s second solution in mind given his
allusion to divine foreknowledge at 45f. Gaskin is one of very few commentators
to appreciate the importance of the distinction between the first and second
solution: he says at 330 that al-Farabi offers (A) as an interpretation of Aristotle
but (B) “in propria voce”.
11 I would caution the reader, though, against reading too much into his acceptance
of (A) as the correct understanding of what “indefinitely true” means. Al-Farabi
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see, his presentation of a solution like the one (B) would find in De int 9
anticipates the conception of modality we find in Ibn Sina. Before
plunging into our analysis of al-Farabi’s solutions, though, I want to
draw attention to another underappreciated aspect of his commentary
on ch. 9, namely his claim about the procedure here employed by Aris-
totle.12
I. A Methodological Observation
It is standard in discussions of De int 9 to present Aristotle as offering
us a dilemma. On the one hand, PB is a bedrock principle of Aristote-
lian logic, and as stated above holds for any assertoric statement. On
the other, we have a strong intuition that some events, particularly
those involving our own choices, are contingent. The determinist argu-
ment of De int 9 is then supposed to show that we must abandon one of
these two commitments. Depending on our interpretation, Aristotle re-
sponds either by grasping the first horn of the dilemma and restricting
PB so as not to apply to statements about future contingents (as (A)
would have it), or by diagnosing the determinist’s argument as sophis-
tical ((B) is one of several such readings). Either way, Aristotle is trying
may have been closer in time to the commentators than we are, but his access to
their discussions was certainly worse: for one thing, it would seem that he worked
only with sometimes garbled Arabic versions of Aristotle and the commentaries,
whereas we have the Greek. So those who want to see the Greek and Latin com-
mentators as holding (B) should not despair to learn that al-Farabi disagreed
with them.
12 In addition to the works already cited, there are a few other studies of al-Farabi’s
treatment of De int 9. The most significant is Baffioni / Nasti de Vincentis 1981,
which includes an Italian translation and commentary by Baffioni and further
discussion by de Vincentis. There is an English translation with short introduc-
tion in Gyeke 1977. The text is discussed in Zaroug 1972, and in Marmura 1985
(see in the same volume the response in Kogan 1985). With regard to the two sol-
utions (A) and (B), Marmura seems to concentrate on the second solution and
hence to ascribe (B) to al-Farabi, though he tries to tie this (at 83) to the question
of whether the event that is predicted is causally determined, which does not seem
to me to arise in the context of al-Farabi’s discussion (see below for this distinc-
tion). Zaroug does not distinguish between the two solutions or between (A) and
(B). In Baffioni / de Vincentis 1981, the contribution by de Vincentis argues
against Rescher’s attribution of solution (B) to al-Farabi. There is, finally, a gen-
eral discussion of the medieval reception of De int in Black 1991; al-Farabi’s com-
mentary is discussed at 48ff., though Black does not here discuss the sea battle
problem in detail.
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to find a way out of a dilemma that threatens the reality of contingency
and hence free will.13
Al-Farabi is emphatic that this way of understanding Aristotle’s pro-
cedure is mistaken. The reason it is mistaken is that it invites us to see
contingency as threatened by the argument. But, according to al-Fa-
rabi, Aristotle is not trying to save contingency and rebut determinism,
rather he is assuming from the outset that determinism is false. He thus
sees the chapter as having the structure, not of a dilemma, but of a re-
ductio: a certain view about the status of statements about the future
leads to determinism; therefore, because we know for certain that some
things are contingent, that view is wrong (see Commentary 84.6–10).
Al-Farabi takes the “commentators” to task for not understanding this
(84.10–16). For it would follow from their dilemmatic analysis of the
text that we are here, in a treatise on logic, attempting to determine the
metaphysical status of contingency: logic would then determine, “re-
garding the natures of things that exist, how they exist”. But the com-
mentators themselves, when they discuss the Categories, reject this pro-
cedure.
Al-Farabi’s polemic against the commentators’ dilemmatic analysis of the chapter
is important in several respects14. Firstly, he is not wrong in ascribing this analysis
to the commentators: it is found in Ammonius. Ammonius explains in the course of
his commentary why the sea battle problem is relevant to all parts of philosophy.
In logic, as well as in ethics, physics and first philosophy (i.e. theology), one must
“investigate whether all that comes to be arises of necessity or whether some things
arise from chance and spontaneously” (130.36–131.1) – though in ethics one must
“assume (προσλαµβνειν)” that “not all things are or come to be of necessity”
13 Kretzmann states this view particularly clearly in Ammonius / Boethius 1998, 24:
“Aristotle is faced with a dilemma: he must either accept determinism with its
radically counter-intuitive implications or deny what had appeared to him to be
the essential nature of propositions”. A sampling of others with diverse interpre-
tations who nevertheless agree, at least implicitly, with this reading: Hintikka
1973, 153, says that De int 9 presents a dilemmatic aporia; Waterlow 1982, 84
speaks of Aristotle aiming to provide a “defence of human agency” via a defense
of contingency; Bäck 1992, 139, says that in De int 9 “Aristotle seeks to save
chance”; Seel 2001, 17, presents the chapter as showing the inconsistency of a set
of logical principles with the belief in contingency.
14 Here I disagree to some extent with Zimmermann 1981, cviii–cix, who praises al-
Farabi for the “acute observation” that the chapter has the form of a reductio, but
doubts whether any of the ancient commentators used the approach here criti-
cized, and adds, “in view of the fact that al-Farabi embraces a thoroughly tradi-
tional interpretation of the chapter, transmitted no doubt by the very commen-
tators he criticizes, his criticism would seem churlish and pedantic. It amounts to
no more than a correction of emphasis”.
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(130.29–30)15. Later (147.27–148.5), Ammonius seems to gesture in the direction of
al-Farabi’s understanding of the chapter as a reductio, when he says that Aristotle
calls the consequences of determinism “‘absurdities’, although he has not yet shown
that they are absurd, relying on the innate concepts of our souls (τα« ατοφψωσιν
ννοupsilonhookαι« τν χψξν ποξρµενο«) and intending to bring on immediately the dem-
onstration of the absurdity of the argument that attempts to destroy the contingent”.
But then he adds:
For he had to show what the nature of the thing was by itself (δει γρ ατ τε κα!"
α#τ$ δεικνupsilontildeναι τ$ πρ»γµα &π« ξει φupsilontildeσε«) by saying that the contingent was
among the things that exist (since many impossible things follow for those seeking
to destroy it, and evidence shows that it exists (κα' ( νργεια δεupsilonhookκνψσιν ατ$
#φεστηκ«)), and in addition he had to show that the aforementioned argument,
which tried to make everything necessary and to expel the contingent from the
things that exist, was unsound.16
Thus Ammonius sees the chapter as an attempt to refute an argument against con-
tingency, rather than as an appeal to contingency to settle a dispute within logic. And
he explicitly says that De int 9 is an inquiry into the nature and existence of the con-
tingent, and that the discussion is important for metaphysics. He goes beyond the
concerns of logic, as al-Farabi complains. Interestingly, though, our other most im-
portant ancient commentary on the chapter, that of Boethius, agrees with al-Farabi.
Boethius gives a “syllogism” summarizing the chapter’s structure, which is a reductio
that begins from the claim that all affirmations have definite truth values, and ends in
the absurd consequence that determinism is true.17 This may be original with Boe-
thius; in any case it may be that al-Farabi knew only of Greek sources that gave the
dilemmatic interpretation.18
A second point to note here is al-Farabi’s confidence in claiming cer-
tain knowledge that some things are contingent. It is not the logical
status of statements that is “known in itself, with a primary, evident
knowledge (ma luman bi-nafsihi bi-ilm awwal bayyin) that involves
no doubt” (83.11). Rather, it is the reality of contingency that is known
to us “from the very beginning and through what is innate to us
(fitarina)” (83.13–14). Contingency, furthermore, is grasped primarily
through our immediate awareness that we possess a power of “choice
and volition (ikhtiyar, irada)” (83.15). We must “posit it among the self-
evident premisses (al-muqaddamat al-bayyina bi-anfusiha) and prin-
ciples” (84.5). All of this is expressed in terminology reminiscent of
other Farabian works, for example the beginning of the Attainment of
15 He is followed in this by Stephanus 2000, 153.
16 The translation of these passages is from Ammonius / Boethius 1998.
17 See Ammonius / Boethius 1998, 134.
18 Although he does speak at 83.8 only of “most commentators (jull al-mufassirin)”.
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Happiness: “The theoretical virtues are those kinds of knowledge (al-
ulum) whose ultimate objective is to bring it about that the existents
and whatever they embrace are intelligible with certainty, and nothing
else. Some of these kinds of knowledge are attained by man from the
outset […]. These are the primary sorts of knowledge (al-ulum al-
awwal) […]. Things known by primary knowledge are the primary
premises (al-muqaddamat al-awwal), and from them one comes to
further knowledge, which is reached by investigation, discovery, teach-
ing, and learning”19.
The vividness of al-Farabi’s rhetoric in this section is directed not so much against
the misleading interpretation of the commentators, but rather the denial of contin-
gency and freedom on the part of some of his own contemporaries. These are people
who, ignoring their innate instinct (fitra), invoke tradition, the Law and authority
(wad , shari a, qawl) to insist that contingency does not exist, and thus that humans
have no power of choice. As Zimmermann has pointed out20, the targets of this dia-
tribe are bound to be mutakallimun, such as Jahm b. Safwan, who denied human free
choice. Against them al-Farabi insists, more stridently than elsewhere but still con-
sistently with his other works21, that our belief in human freedom is not threatened
by any argument for determinism. Indeed, it is impossible that it be so threatened, be-
cause we accept the existence of contingency as an immediate first principle. Thus
there are no considerations that could, even in theory, induce rational doubt about it.
It is worth noting in this regard that al-Farabi conflates two sorts of
determinism in his zeal to chastize his opponents. The sort of determin-
ism relevant to De int 9 is logical determinism, whereas the determinism
of al-Farabi’s contemporaries would normally have been causal deter-
minism, embraced in order to safeguard divine omnipotence – hence
the debate about whether the “power (qudra)” for human actions in
fact lies with God.22 Both sorts of determinism hold that everything
19 Al-Farabi 1926, 2. For an English translation of this work see Mahdi 1962.
20 Zimmermann 1981, cxiii–cxviii.
21 For example he insists that voluntary actions proceeding from deliberation are
immune to causal determination by the stars. On this see Druart 1981, 39–40.
22 The dispute over qudra begins within the first few hundred years of the advent of
Islam: see for example Schwartz 1967. This question of causal determinism by
God is rarely distinguished with any clarity from the question of whether God’s
foreknowledge implies determinism. For example al-Farabi’s own student, Yahya
b. Adi, raises the deterministic argument that God knows all existents (mawju-
dat), and the state of His knowledge must be like the state of the objects of His
knowledge, but the state of His knowledge is necessary (daruri) and unchanging,
so that what He knows must also be necessary and unchanging. This is an argu-
ment for logical determinism, but in refuting it he argues that divine foreknowl-
edge does not necessitate our actions because it does not fall into any of the ac-
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happens necessarily, but causal determinism is compatible with the
view that some or even all events are contingent in themselves, though
they are made necessary by prior events or agents.23 Of course the sea
battle problem and the solutions to it given by al-Farabi deal only with
logical determinism. Yet his claim that we have an innate awareness of
freedom and thus of contingency is of course a relevant, though ques-
tion-begging, response to either logical or causal determinism. This
shows why he is so concerned to emphasize that Aristotle takes it for
granted that determinism is false, and thus that the structure of the
chapter is that of a reductio: it gives him an ally, in the shape of Aristotle
no less, in his insistence that we all know immediately and without
doubt that we have freedom.
This brings us back to De int 9 itself: what, if any, are the conse-
quences of al-Farabi’s methodological point for his understanding of
the chapter as a whole? For one thing, it shows that whatever is his sol-
ution to the sea battle, it ought not to be on an epistemic par with our
intuition of contingency. It should not, that is, appeal directly to a first
principle, because then the solution would be just as “obvious” as the
reality of contingency, and not need to be established via the reductio.
Al-Farabi acknowledges this explicitly later on, when he is discussing
whether to accept the notion of possibility and necessity set forth in his
second solution. He says that this notion is not something “evident in
itself (bayyin fi nafsihi)” (100.15–16), echoing the terminology of the
earlier passage. The implication is clear: people might honestly and
rationally disagree about the status of statements regarding future con-
tingents, but not about whether contingency itself is real. Furthermore,
al-Farabi’s analysis of the chapter’s structure puts him firmly in the
camp of those who think that determinism is a valid consequence that
follows from asserting some logical principle, namely a strong version
of PB that says that every statement is determinately true or false. He
cepted classes of cause. (To be fair to Ibn Adi, he says he is responding to
opponents who have put the problem in this way: “they imagine that foreknowl-
edge is a necessitating cause (sabab) for things”, 67.10–11. He is then perhaps
only responding to others who have confused logical with causal determinism.)
This same treatise, Fi ithbat tabi a al-mumkin (“On the Nature of the Possible”),
ends with a commentary on De int 9. See Ehrig-Eggert 1989, 66 in the Arabic
pagination. For a translation of and commentary on the work, see Ehrig-Eggert
1990.
23 I have recently argued that al-Farabi’s predecessor al-Kindi was a causal but not
a logical determinist: see Adamson 2003, 66–75. Avicenna may have held the
same view; see Ivry 1984.
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would have no truck with the suggestion that Aristotle is just trying to
unmask a sophistry. Instead, he concentrates all his attention on reject-
ing the first premise, and claiming that PB holds for some statements
only “indeterminately”. It is to this claim, then, that we must now turn
our own attention.
II. The First Solution: P is only “indeterminately true or false”
Al-Farabi begins his treatment of De int 9 by characterizing Aristotle’s
program in the chapter as follows:
Commentary 81.9–12: Now Aristotle comes to the fourth task (amr) regarding an-
titheses, namely to consider the state (hal) of antitheses in the three times [sc. past,
present and future]. Of what sort is each of the antitheses’ distribution (iqtisam) of
the true and the false in each of the three times? Do each of them distribute [the
true and false] definitely (ala #l-tahsil), indefinitely (la ala #l-tahsil), or do some
distribute definitely and some indefinitely?
Thus the question of what he means by “definitely” and “indefinitely”
is a pressing matter from the very outset. To reiterate, there are two in-
terpretations to be considered. On (A), he means that two antitheses
distribute truth and falsity “indefinitely” if neither is yet true to the ex-
clusion of the other, but both are either-true-or-false. On (B), he means
they are indefinite if one of the two antitheses is true, and the other
false, but they are respectively indefinitely true and indefinitely false.
This means that the thing, event, or state of affairs to which they refer is
contingent and not necessary.
It is natural to begin by looking at the terminology used to express this. The
phrase ala #l-tahsil corresponds to φρισµων« in the commentators, but it does not
have the same connotation. "Αφορupsilonhookζ means something like “delimit”, “distinguish”,
or “separate”. Thus to say that future contingent antitheses fail to distribute truth
and falsity φρισµων« seems to be grist for the mill of interpretation (A): the two
antitheses do not “separate” truth from falsity.24 As Marmura has remarked, ala
#l-tahsil could be translated literally “as ‘by way of realization,’ ‘by way of obtain-
ment,’ or an equivalent of this, the idea conveyed being that of something completed
and settled”25. Thus to say that something is true “indefinitely” (al-Farabi uses the
24 As is pointed out by Gaskin 1995, 150.
25 Marmura 1985, 82. Baffioni, in Baffioni / de Vincentis 1981, 34f., suggests that
the phrase could also have the epistemological sense of what we come to know
(tahsil can mean acquisition of knowledge); thus it has a “subjective”, as well as
an “objective” connotation.
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expressions la ala #l-tahsil, ghayr ala #l-tahsil, fi adam al-tahsil, and ghayr muhassal)
might naturally be taken to support (A): “definite” would mean that it is already
“settled” that one antithesis is true to the exclusion of the other, and “indefinite”
would mean that neither antithesis is yet true. However, if we consider the fact that
for Aristotle and al-Farabi, present and past events are necessary, then we could
understand the phrase in accordance with (B) as well. For if events that have already
“happened” (hasala) are thereby necessary, ala #l-tahsil could mean “established
necessarily”. Of course, we should not rely too much on the connotation of the
Arabic phrase in arguing for either interpretation. The terminology was not original
with al-Farabi, but would have been present already in his Arabic version of De int.
At most it guided his own reading of the philosophical issues, but he did not choose it
in order to express that reading.
Let us turn instead, then, to al-Farabi’s use of the terminology, to see
whether he gives us any clues as to how he took the phrase. Interpre-
tation (B) seems to be strikingly confirmed by the following passage:
Commentary 82.21–25: Aristotle means that the situation of antitheses regarding
[future contingents] is not that the true one of the two is true definitely (laysa
#l-sadiq min-huma sadiq ala #l-tahsil), and the false one false definitely, either in
itself or for us. [Aristotle means rather] that the state of the affirmative and
negative antitheses about [future contingents] is like the state of the existence of
[the future contingents]. Because their existence is indefinite, the truth of one of
the antitheses is also indefinite (kana aydan sidq ahad al-mutaqabilayn ghayr mu-
hassal). Likewise, because the non-existence of the one of them that will not exist
is indefinite (kana la wujud ma la yujadu min-ha ghayr muhassal), the falsehood of
one of the antitheses is indefinite, both in itself and for us.
Al-Farabi seems to say here precisely what interpretation (B) requires,
and interpretation (A) cannot allow: that of two antitheses regarding
future contingents, one of them is true, and the other one is false. Nor is
this an isolated example. For instance at one point he restates Aris-
totle’s central question as follows (84.6–7): “regarding antitheses, is
truth in one of the two and falsity in the other definitely, or not?” He
answers: “for a pair of antitheses regarding possibles, the truth of the
true antithesis (sidq al-sadiq min al-mutaqabilayn) is indefinite in itself”
(84.9–10). This strongly suggests that al-Farabi accepts, as (B) needs
him to, that truth and falsity are indeed distributed between the two an-
titheses. The question is, “how is the true one true, definitely or indefi-
nitely?” which already assumes that one of them is true to the exclusion
of the other.
Interpretation (B) might also take encouragement from al-Farabi’s
willingness to speak of things other than such antitheses as being “in-
definite”. He says that contingent things have indefinite “existence
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(wujud)” (e.g. at 81.16–17, and in a passage just cited, at 82.23–24),
and also that possible things have an indefinite “cause (sabab)”
(86.26–28). The notion of indefinite existence is easy enough to
understand on (B): something exists indefinitely if and only if it is
contingent. Perhaps one might also make sense of “indefinite exist-
ence” on (A), by saying that what exists indefinitely does not yet
either exist or not exist, just as a statement about the future is not yet
either true or false, precisely because either could occur.26 “Indefinite
cause” is a bit more difficult for (A), because al-Farabi seems to
equate it with an “accidental cause (sabab bi-arad)”. It is natural to
understand this as saying that an indefinite cause is a cause that is ac-
tual but that might not have obtained, i.e. a cause compatible with
contingency, rather than as a cause that does not yet either obtain or
not obtain. However, if al-Farabi follows Aristotle in thinking that the
past and present are necessary, as he seems to do at one point27, then it
will be only future things that have such indefinite causes. This makes
the latter reading, that an indefinite cause is one that does not yet ob-
tain, more plausible.
In any case, these points in favor of (B) are overwhelmed by the evi-
dence in favor of (A). An important piece of this evidence was already
noted by Zimmermann: in the Treatise, al-Farabi says that in the case
of antitheses about the contingent, “it is not possible that truth be
definite (muhassal) for one of the aforementioned and falsity for the
other, such that it is impossible for the true one to be false and the
false one to be true”28. Zimmermann took this as sufficient evidence
for (A) and has been followed by Gaskin.29 There is room for doubt,
though. Although it is striking that al-Farabi denies specifically that
truth attaches to one rather the other, just as he should on interpre-
tation (A), he goes on to add, “in such a way as to make it impossible
for the true one to be false”. So supporters of (B) might argue that
what al-Farabi means is that neither antithesis can singly be true in a
26 Al-Farabi speaks of the indefinite has having a “deficiency” or “lack” (naqs) in
its existence (e.g. at 97.22). This could be interpreted as being in harmony with
either (A) or (B), it seems to me.
27 At 82.4–5 he says that the past and present things mentioned at De int 18a28ff.
are subject to “definite” truth and falsity, which on either (A) or (B) implies
necessity. The conception of modality deployed in the second solution would
imply however that the present and past are not necessary.
28 Küyel-Türker 1966, 79.14–16. See Zimmermann 1981, 244–245.
29 Zimmermann 1981, lxviii; Gaskin 1995, 329–330.
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definite way, that is, in a way that would make the future event necess-
ary.30
Turning to the Commentary, then, what is the case to be made for
interpretation (A)? Let us first begin by returning to the use of the
phrase ala #l-tahsil to mean “definite”. It is worth noting a passage
where al-Farabi says al-majhul ghayr muhassal al-sidq fi #l-nafsina
(very literally: “the unknown does not have truth occurring in our
souls”). Here the same root h-s-l, indeed the same phrase al-Farabi
sometimes uses for “indefinite” (ghayr muhassal), is used to express
the fact that what is “unknown (majhul)” to us is that to which we are
unable to assign truth. If al-Farabi thinks of the truth of an antithesis,
rather than its subject-matter, as that which does not “occur” in the
case of statements about future contingents, then (A) has to be the
correct interpretation.
Second, let us consider the point that al-Farabi often speaks of only
one antithesis as being true. While this is a powerful argument for (B),
indeed in my view the only strong evidence for (B), still al-Farabi some-
times seems to use caution in avoiding the locution. One example is the
aforementioned passage from the Treatise. Another is his first charac-
terization of the definite and indefinite at 81.9–15, which is likely to be
his most careful formulation. Here he speaks of the definite by saying
that one antithesis is true, the other false, and that the truth of the true
one is “distinguished (mutamayyiz)” from the falsity of the false one.
When he comes to the indefinite, though, he says only that the anti-
theses are in an indefinite state, “both in themselves and in our souls”31,
without suggesting that the true and false are distinguished.
30 Gaskin 1995, 330, admits that the use of the word “impossible” is, as he says,
“unfortunate”, insofar as al-Farabi is entitled to a stronger claim, and that the
phrase could give encouragement to supporters of (B) (which he calls “R” for
“Realist”). He thinks that al-Farabi’s claim shortly thereafter (Zimmermann’s
245), which reiterates that in the case of indefinite truth it is not the case “that
this particular one is true rather than the other”, confirms reading (A). However
that is only in the context of a statement about our epistemic status regarding in-
definites, so again the supporter of (B) might escape by supposing that al-Farabi
only means that we cannot say which is true and which is false, even though one is
in fact (indefinitely) true and the other (indefinitely) false. Of course I argue here
only as devil’s advocate, since I agree with Gaskin’s interpretation of these pas-
sages; but I believe that the interpretation requires support from the Commen-
tary, which is in any case the more complex and significant treatment of these
questions.
31 There is an untranslatable pun on nafs (“self” or “soul”) in this last phrase here:
“in themselves” is fi anfusiha, and “in our souls” is fi anfusina.
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Now, let us turn to the positive evidence for interpretation (A). First,
consider the passage just mentioned, in which al-Farabi says that an-
titheses about the future are indefinite “in our souls”. This is one of nu-
merous points at which al-Farabi is careful to emphasize that the sea
battle problem is not merely epistemic. That is, he consistently distin-
guishes between how things stand “for us (inda-na)” and how they are
“in themselves”, and points out that even in the case of necessary
things we might be unable to know things definitely, even though they
are definite in themselves. But on interpretation (B), what sense does
it make for something to be “indefinite for us”? For (B), “indefinite”
needs to mean “true, but compatible with contingency”. But al-Farabi
clearly means that that which is indefinite to us is that of which we are
ignorant; indeed he says so explicitly (97.16–17). So interpretation (B)
would require that, in the passages where al-Farabi speaks of antitheses
being “indefinite in themselves and to us”, “indefinite” is equivocal.
“In itself” an indefinite antithesis would be true, and not false, but
“for us” its being indefinite would mean precisely that it is neither true
nor false (or, if you prefer, either-true-or-false, but not yet one or the
other).32
Second, al-Farabi seems to consider necessity to follow from truth, in
the way described above (if P then Nec P). A crucial step in the argu-
ment of ch. 9 is the passage where Aristotle says, in laying out the
deterministic argument, “if every affirmation or negation is either true
or false, then it is necessary that everything is existent or non-existent”
(18a34–35, translated from the Arabic version). As we have already
seen, al-Farabi thinks that Aristotle’s deterministic argument is a valid
one, but proceeds from a faulty premise. So it is unsurprising that the
move proposed by Aristotle at 18a34–35 is wholeheartedly endorsed by
al-Farabi: “this universal judgment is self-evidently correct” (Commen-
tary 85.12). He then adds, “for from the true statement follows the thing
(al-amr), and from the false statement follows the non-existence of the
thing” (85.12–13). This inference from simple truth to necessity is dis-
astrous for interpretation (B), the whole point of which is to say that
“there will be a sea battle” can be true without the sea battle’s occurring
necessarily. The passage can only be reconciled with (B) by pointing out
32 In Boethius and Ammonius we similarly find use of “definite” or “indefinite” to
refer to epistemic states (e.g. God’s knowledge of the future must be “definite”
whereas ours is “indefinite”) and to modify the truth values of propositions. So
the point with regard to al-Farabi is equally applicable to these other commen-
tators.
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that al-Farabi does speak a couple of lines later of “definite truth”
(85.15). But at the very least, (A) receives support from the fact that he
does not immediately or explicitly say that we need to understand “defi-
nitely” as modifying the passage, as do the ancient commentators in
similar contexts.33 Still worse for (B), at one point al-Farabi comes to
explain what it means for something to be definitely the case, but says
only: “from the two [antitheses], the affirmation alone is true, to the ex-
clusion of the negation (al-mujab min-huma huwa al-sadiq wahdahu,
duna al-salb)”34. On interpretation (B), this would describe the indefi-
nitely true affirmation no less than the definitely true affirmation.
Thus the prima facie case for interpreting the first solution in accord-
ance with (A) is very strong, simply to judge from the way al-Farabi
speaks of the indefinitely true and false. We have still to consider several
more complicated philosophical issues relative to this first solution.
First, we have the following rather puzzling passage, regarding the final
lemma of ch. 9:
Commentary 97.7–15: [Aristotle] sets down the truth of the antitheses regarding
any type of thing as being in accordance with its existence. For that whose exist-
ence is definite, the truth of the antitheses regarding it is definite. But for that
whose existence is indefinite, the truth of the antitheses regarding it is indefinite.
For each of the types of necessary things, the truth of the antitheses regarding it is
definite. But for each of the types of possible things, the truth of the antitheses re-
garding it is indefinite. However, in the case of the equally possible [the truth] is
completely indefinite (fi #l-mumkin al-tasawi ala ghayr al-tahsil al-tamm), and
truth and falsehood are by chance. But in the case of the possible that happens
more often (ala #l-akthar), the truth of one of the antitheses regarding it is more
appropriate (ahra) than its falsehood. But in the case of what happens less often,
its falsehood is more appropriate than [its] truth. Likewise, opposed beliefs about
the types of existing things are in the same state regarding truth and falsehood.
What al-Farabi says here seems flatly incompatible with (B), because
according to (B) there should be no “degree” of truth for an antithesis
about the future: either it is true or it is false. He seems rather to im-
agine, especially in the case of the “equally possible”, i.e. a fifty-fifty
chance, precisely what (A) suggests, which is that truth is not yet as-
signed exclusively to either antithesis, and will be assigned as chance
will have it. The passage is compatible with (A) but seems to add some-
thing, namely the concept of a “more appropriate” truth.
33 E.g. Ammonius / Boethius 1998, 104, 158; Stephanus 2000, 156.
34 He explains the definitely true in a similar way at Treatise 79.
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What does al-Farabi mean here? He has already told us that “we
must understand ‘more often (fi #l-akthar)’ to mean ‘more of the time’
or ‘in more of the subject matter (mawdu  al-shay#)’” (95.6–7).35 This is
problematic, since the examples of antitheses regarding future contin-
gents that are given by al-Farabi, like those given by Aristotle, all seem
to refer to particular events, which happen only once (the particular sea
battle, the particular cloak that may or may not be cut up). Al-Farabi’s
most prominent example, which is introduced in the course of the sec-
ond solution, is “Zayd will make a trip tomorrow”. But Zayd can only
make a trip tomorrow once, he cannot do it “more often” than not.
What al-Farabi must mean is that a statement about a future contingent
may predict a particular instance of something that happens in general,
though it need not. Thus, if tomorrow is Thursday, and Zayd goes to
the marketplace almost every Thursday, then the truth of the statement
“Zayd will make a trip tomorrow” is “more appropriate” than its fals-
ity. Still, it is “indefinite” that Zayd make the trip, because he could still
stay home, so (according to interpretation (A) at least), it is not yet true
that Zayd will make the trip tomorrow. Thus al-Farabi uses the phrase
“completely indefinite” to describe the fifty-fifty chance: he has in
mind a continuum between the “completely definite”, which is a state-
ment that is simply true, because it predicts something that will occur
necessarily, and the “completely indefinite”, which is just as likely not
to occur as to occur. I see no way that interpretation (B) could accom-
modate this passage. For we can make some sort of sense of a truth that
is not yet assigned being called “more appropriate” to one antithesis,
insofar as that antithesis is more likely to turn out true. But it makes no
sense for such an antithesis to be “more appropriately true” because it
refers to something that is closer to being necessary than being contin-
gent36.
35 The long passage just cited refers back to the lemma here explicated, which is De
int 19a18–27, with the phrase ahra wa akthar, “more appropriate and more
often”, at 94.16 in the Arabic version of the lemma.
36 The line of thought I am here ascribing to al-Farabi needs to be distinguished
from a possible third interpretation of “indefinite” truth, which has been put for-
ward in an unpublished paper by Robert Sharples (“Ammonius and the Sea
Battle: Standard and Non-Standard Interpretations”). Sharples proposes that
Ammonius held a view, which he calls the “Intermediate Interpretation”, distinct
from (A) and (B). According to the Intermediate Interpretation, a statement is
indefinitely true insofar as it now looks likely to turn out true – or because if
things go on as they are now, it will turn out true. Sharples points out that the
ancient commentators speak of truths as being “variable” over time, so that the
statement “there will be a sea battle tomorrow” might be “indefinitely true” now,
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Two final considerations in favor of (A) emerge from considering the
relation of the first solution to the second solution, to which we will
presently turn. One consideration is that the first solution must be dis-
tinct from the second solution. For al-Farabi explicitly introduces the
problem of divine foreknowledge as one that the first solution cannot
resolve, and the second solution as the answer to the new difficulty. But,
as I will explain below, the second solution is the solution that interpre-
tation (B) would ascribe to Aristotle. Instead al-Farabi explicitly pres-
ents it as an alternative to Aristotle’s solution. Therefore the correct in-
terpretation of Aristotle, according to al-Farabi, must be distinct from
(B).
A second consideration is the presentation of the problem of divine
foreknowledge itself. This begins with the following passage, which
comes on the heels of a restatement of the first solution at the end of the
commentary proper on ch. 9:
Commentary 97.27–98.5: If this is the case then someone might ask about God’s
knowledge of one of the antitheses regarding possibles: is it comprehended by
[His knowledge] (hal huwa muhit bi-hi)? If so, then what will be the state of the
truth of one of the antitheses for Him? Is its truth for Him, in accordance with His
knowledge of it (bi-hasab ilmihi bi-hi), definite or not? If this is not definite for
Him, then it will lack definiteness for Him just as it does for us. Then God would
not know, regarding future possibles, which of the antitheses will come about
(yahsulu: same root as tahsil), the affirmative or negative. So these things will
be unknown for God, and God will not know things before their occurrence
(kawn).37
It is easy to see why this would pose an additional problem not yet
solved by Aristotle, if Aristotle is correctly interpreted by (A): since
future contingents are indefinite not only to us, but in themselves, they
are unknowable in principle or “by nature” (as al-Farabi has just said at
97.20). This is because statements concerning them are, in themselves,
as yet neither true nor false (or individually either-true-or-false). They
are unknown because there is, as yet, nothing to know. But then God
cannot know them either. He would only know them if they were “defi-
because the generals are already sending the ships into the battle zone, but “in-
definitely false” an hour from now, because a peace treaty has been signed. This
cannot be what al-Farabi means, for two reasons. First, he does not anywhere
speak of the truth values as being changeable over time. Second, if this were what
he meant by “indefinitely true” it would make no sense to speak of a fifty-fifty
chance as being “completely indefinite”.
37 For the sake of readability I have not included the honorific phrases (e.g. “the
mighty and exalted”) that follow each mention of God in the text.
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nite”, that is, if there were already a true statement about the future
contingent whose truth He could grasp.
For (B), on the other hand, this passage is problematic. There seems no reason
God couldn’t know the truth of a true statement about the future, simply because the
event to which it refers will occur contingently. One way for (B) to make sense of the
passage is to lean heavily on the need for God to know with certainty that, e.g., Zayd
will make the journey. Perhaps he supposes that certain knowledge, especially divine
knowledge, must have something necessary as its object. But if that is what al-Farabi
means, he falls well short of making his meaning clear here; rather, he seems to think
divine ignorance follows immediately and obviously from the claim that statements
about future contingents are intrinsically indefinite. A more promising line of argu-
ment for (B) would be to suggest that God must necessarily know what He knows
(hence, perhaps, the talk of God’s needing to know things “definitely”). This would
have the virtue of explaining why divine foreknowledge presents an additional prob-
lem to those canvassed in De int 9 itself. Suppose that God necessarily knows that a
statement P about a future contingent is true. It might be thought to follow that P is
now not just true, but necessarily true. And that, on (B), is precisely what Aristotle is
trying to avoid. Unfortunately for (B) this interpretation too has an Achilles heel: as
will become clear below, the solution al-Farabi will go on to give would be vitiated by
the assumption that P is now necessarily true.
It seems abundantly clear, then, that interpretation (A) is the correct
reading of al-Farabi’s first solution, the solution he finds in Aristotle.
Now let us turn to the second.
III. The Second Solution: Two Types of Necessity
After he has introduced the problem of divine foreknowledge, al-Farabi
explains how troubling it would be, were the problem to remain un-
solved. We cannot simply say that God is ignorant of future events:
Commentary 98.5–10: This is repugnant and unacceptable. All religions claim
otherwise, and it seems very harmful for people to believe this. But if so, and if
God knows the truth of one of the antitheses definitely, then indefiniteness (adam
al-tahsil) is not in the very nature of the thing. Then our ignorance of it would not
be caused by the nature of the thing, but by a deficiency in our own nature. And
if this is the case, then the truth of one of the two antitheses is definite in itself
(fi dhatihi), but we don’t know it. So it would be just like the indefiniteness, for us,
of necessary matters of which we are ignorant.
In contrast with the original sea battle problem as al-Farabi under-
stands it, the problem of divine foreknowledge is here set out as a genu-
ine dilemma. The argument would force us to choose between deter-
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minism and the belief in divine foreknowledge, in a way that al-Farabi
believes we were not forced in De int 9 to choose between determinism
and the denial of PB. Reasonably enough, al-Farabi is of the view that
we do not have immediate intuitive certainty that God knows the fu-
ture, the way we do that some things are contingent. We will return to
this point below.
Al-Farabi considers two ways of dealing with the problem, both of
which (again, in contrast to his treatment of the deterministic argument
in De int 9) seek to avoid being caught on either horn of the dilemma.
The first, unsuccessful attempt, is described as follows:
Commentary 98.21–24: Some people answer that God knows every existent in the
way it exists (bi-hasab wujudihi). So He knows the necessary necessarily, and the
possible possibly, and He knows antitheses regarding necessity according to what
they are about, and antitheses regarding possibility according to what they are
about.
As Zimmermann has remarked, this solution probably has its ulti-
mate basis in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who says in De
fato that “since to have foreknowledge of the things that are going to
be is to have cognizance of them as being such as they are (for having
foreknowledge is different from bringing about), it is clear that he who
has foreknowledge of things that are contingent will have foreknowl-
edge of them as such (hôs toionta)”38. This is a promising answer,
but al-Farabi dismisses it, as Zimmermann says, with a “snort of con-
tempt”39:
Commentary 98.24–28: In their answer, they do not add anything more than this.
Upon my life, this answer will satisfy only a questioner who is content with ignor-
ance! If it is examined a bit more closely, it does not [follow] from this answer that
God does not know the truth of one of the antitheses definitely, if what He knows,
in accordance with (bi-hasab) the existence of the possible, is not that the truth of
one of the antitheses regarding it is true definitely.40 Giving this answer amounts
to admitting that God does not know the possible before its occurrence.
It is clear that al-Farabi thinks that the suggested response is mere
verbiage; but verbiage of what sort? The passage is not particularly
38 Translation and Greek text in Sharples 1983; this is Sharples’ translation, at 81
(201.13–15 in the Greek). Cf. Zimmermann 1981, lxxxvi, note 1.
39 Zimmermann 1981, xcv; in note 2 on this page he interprets al-Farabi’s under-
standing of the Alexandrian solution roughly as I do in what follows.
40 This difficult sentence requires numerous textual emendations, and al-Farabi’s
generous use of negations does not make it easier to follow his train of thought.
As usual I have followed the readings suggested by Zimmermann.
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clear, but the last sentence tells us that he thinks the solution would
simply grasp one horn of the dilemma, and admit that God is ignorant
of future events. In light of this, it would seem that al-Farabi under-
stands the answer (“God knows the possible possibly”) to mean “God
knows that P is possibly true”. But, given the resources of the first sol-
ution, this is what even humans know about the possible: that it may
occur or not. So we are thrown back on the claim that such statements
are, for God, indefinite, meaning that neither antithesis is true to the ex-
clusion of the other.
In what follows al-Farabi presents a solution that he finds much pre-
ferable. Ironically, this solution is not unlike what Alexander was in fact
proposing. Here is his opening attempt to explain the solution:
Commentary 99.1–8: The right answer is to say that something’s following from
something else necessarily is not the same as the thing that follows being necessary
in itself. For, from the truth of the affirmative statement, there does follow the
necessity of the thing’s existence. But from this it does not follow that the thing
necessarily exists in itself. Rather, its following from the truth of the statement is
necessary. A thing may follow from something else necessarily, but not be necess-
ary in itself. For example, conclusions that are possible in themselves follow
necessarily from the syllogisms that lead to them, without those conclusions that
follow necessarily being necessary in themselves. For their possibility is not re-
moved by the necessity of their following from the premises.
What al-Farabi is suggesting, in a rather labored fashion, is this. Sup-
pose that the statement “there will be a sea battle tomorrow” is now
true. Though it does follow necessarily from this that there will be a sea
battle, still the sea battle is not intrinsically necessary, but contingent.
His comparison to the syllogism is helpful: from premises that are
contingently true a contingently true conclusion necessarily follows.41
Al-Farabi goes on to make this yet clearer with the aforementioned
example of Zayd’s making a trip tomorrow. If I say now truly that Zayd
will make the trip, it follows from this that he will do so; yet still “there
is in Zayd the possibility that he stay home. The only necessity involved
is the necessity that his leaving his house follows from the true state-
ment. But if we grant that Zayd is capable (qadir) of staying home or of
making the trip, then these two antithetical outcomes are equally poss-
ible” (99.13–15). This distinction between two kinds of necessity allows
him to solve the problem of divine foreknowledge by saying that al-
though God knows that the statement “Zayd will make the trip” is true,
41 On this analogy see Gyeke 1977, 35.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek der LMU Muenchen
Angemeldet | 129.187.254.47
Heruntergeladen am | 10.07.13 09:35
The Arabic Sea Battle 183
this is compatible with Zayd’s having the possibility or “capability” to
stay at home.42
There are several things worth noting about this solution, which as
far as we can tell is being put forward by al-Farabi as his own invention.
First, al-Farabi’s point will work just as well against the original sea
battle problem as it does against the dilemma of divine foreknowl-
edge.43 This is why I have referred to it as al-Farabi’s “second solution”
to the problem presented in De int 9, even though al-Farabi thinks it is
not the one Aristotle had in mind. If ascribed to Aristotle the solution
would yield a version of interpretation (B), and a different analysis of
Aristotle’s argument. For according to what al-Farabi has said here, as
on (B), statements about future contingents may be true (only true, and
not either-true-or-false) without the event they predict being necessary.
Like interpreters who put forward a version of (B) as a reading of Aris-
totle’s own view, al-Farabi additionally provides an explanation of
where the deterministic argument goes wrong. Suppose that P is the
proposition “it is true at t1 that Zayd will travel at a future time t2”, and
Q the proposition “it is true at t2 that Zayd travels”. Then the determin-
ist fallaciously assumes that Nec (If P then Q), which is true, is tanta-
mount to or implies If P then Nec Q, which is false.44 It is false because
the truth of a present statement about Zayd’s journey does not exclude
the possibility of Zayd’s staying at home: it just excludes that this possi-
bility will be realized.
42 The use of the word qadir here, along with some of the rhetoric used at the outset
of this section (if determinism were true, “the punishment meted out to man in
this world or in the hereafter will not be the result of things that occurred by his
volition or choice”, Commentary 98.16–17), confirms that al-Farabi is again re-
sponding to debates within contemporary kalam.
43 Note that, as I remarked above, the second solution would not work against the
claim that what God knows is necessarily true, because God necessarily knows it.
Then the occurrence of Zayd’s journey would be like the conclusion of a syllo-
gism with necessary premises, rather than of a syllogism with contingently true
premises.
44 Contrast this to an alternative diagnosis mentioned above, that the determinist
confuses the unobjectionable Nec (P or Not-P) with Nec P or Nec Not-P. Al-Fa-
rabi prefers to speak of the thing (e.g. the journey, the sea battle) as being necess-
ary or possible “in itself”, rather than of statements or propositions about the
thing being necessarily or contingently true. But it is hard to express the fallacy in
these terms, so I have taken the journey’s necessary existence as being equivalent
to the necessary truth of a timeless proposition about the journey. I hope though
that this way of putting it still captures al-Farabi’s essential point.
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This brings us to another important point about the second solution: it commits
al-Farabi to the notion of unactualized possibilities. What is more, al-Farabi knows
it. He says that if we adopt the second solution, we will have to admit that “there may
be something that is eternal and that has always existed, but that possibly does not
exist or is possibly corrupted, and that could even have failed to exist previously”
(Commentary 99.26–27). He compares this to the claim that it is possible for God to
commit injustice, though He never does.45 The Greek sources for his discussion here
are unclear. Al-Farabi ascribes the view to Plato (Aflatun), but Zimmermann sus-
pects that he may have known a garbled reference to the ancient dispute between
Philo and Diodorus Cronus over the proper understanding of modality.46 Certainly
he knows that there was a debate over unactualized possibilities in the ancient world;
he says at one point that the non-existence of what never happens “is necessary from
one point of view and possible from another” (Commentary 100.3–4). But it may be
that the reference to Plato is accurate; it could refer to the Timaeus (41b–c).47
In any case, we here see al-Farabi finding his way from the classical, Aristotelian
model of modality, which has been called the “statistical model”, towards what in the
Arabic tradition is a new modal theory. The statistical model of modality holds that
the possible is what exists sometimes, the necessary is what always exists, and the im-
possible is what never exists. This conception has been ascribed to Aristotle by mod-
ern scholars,48 and it appears in the Arabic tradition both earlier and later than al-
Farabi.49 The new theory is that possibility, necessity and impossibility are intrinsic
to a thing and depend on its nature. A thing may be intrinsically possible and yet al-
ways fail to exist, and a thing may always exist without being intrinsically necessary:
in short, there are possible counterfactuals.50 This theory will be used to great effect
by Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who famously distinguishes between the “necessary-in-
itself” and the “necessary-through-another” that is only possible in itself. Al-Fara-
bi’s discussion of the difference between the two kinds of necessity in the present con-
text anticipates Ibn Sina.51
45 As noted by Zimmermann 1981, cxvii, this was a position held by the early mu-
takallim Abu ’l-Hudhayl.
46 For Philo’s position and the controversy in general see Bobzien 1998, 108–111.
47 My thanks to Taneli Kukkonen for this suggestion.
48 Especially in the early work of J. Hintikka, who even argued that De int 9 could
be understood as motivated by problems deriving from the statistical model; see
Hintikka 1973. However Hintikka later moved away from this reading.
49 The Book of Definitions ascribed to al-Kindi has definitions of “possible”,
“necessary” and “impossible” that set out the statistical model (see Adamson
2002, 266f.). For the statistical model in post-Avicennan Arabic thought see
Kukkonen 2000a and 2000b.
50 The point is also stressed at Baffioni / de Vincentis 1981, 66.
51 Wisnovsky 2003, 219–225, also sees this section of al-Farabi’s commentary as an
important precursor of Avicenna. Wisnovsky’s brief, but excellent, discussion of
the text points out that al-Farabi stops short of fully endorsing the idea of some-
thing being “possible of existence in itself”, possibly because this could imply
that such a thing could exist independently of being caused. I would add that al-
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Given the philosophical and historical importance of al-Farabi’s
“second solution”, it is somewhat astonishing to discover that al-Farabi
himself seems unconvinced of its value. This is clear from the way that
al-Farabi frames the solution. As already noted above, he sets out the
divine foreknowledge problem as a genuine dilemma. As we should ex-
pect, given his earlier remarks about freedom, if we are forced to choose
between divine foreknowledge and contingency, then so much the
worse for divine foreknowledge. The only way he can see to save this
foreknowledge is to give the solution just described, and accept the at-
tending conception of modality. But al-Farabi is strikingly hesitant
here. He reiterates that “this is something that philosophers in antiquity
disagreed about” (Commentary 100.19), and at the end simply con-
cludes that the Philonic, non-statistical understanding of modality is an
“opinion (ra #y) [that is] more useful (anfa) in religions than the other
opinion”. This none-too-ringing endorsement echoes language al-Fa-
rabi used in setting up the dilemma: the rejection of foreknowledge in
God “is repugnant and reprehensible to all religions and very, very
harmful for people to believe” (Commentary 98.18–19).
Readers familiar with the Farabian corpus will recognize in these
passages al-Farabi’s notoriously condescending attitude towards beliefs
adopted within the religious sphere, as contrasted to the demonstrative
scientific knowledge that is embodied by philosophy. But even without
this context it is clear that al-Farabi stops short of fully endorsing his
second solution. The question is why. Of course one possible expla-
nation is that he is reluctant to disagree with Aristotle as understood
by the commentators. On al-Farabi’s understanding, they say that for
Aristotle present statements about future contingents are not definitely
true or false, in the sense that interpretation (A) would give to this
phrase.52 The clash between the authority of Aristotle and the commen-
Farabi does not seem to have left behind the Aristotelian notion that the present
and past are “necessary”, whereas on the new, Avicennan understanding of mo-
dality, even what already obtains and is necessary-through-another remains
merely possible-in-itself.
52 If he were to adopt the second solution as an interpretation of Aristotle, rather
than just a way of escaping from the problem of divine foreknowledge, al-Farabi
would be forced to rethink his entire analysis of De int 9. The step that infers fu-
ture necessity from present truth – which, as we saw, al-Farabi calls “self-evi-
dently correct” in his commentary – would on the second solution be identified
as the fallacious move in the determinist’s argument. The argument as a whole
would be seen as sophistical, rather than as a valid argument that proceeds from
a bad premise.
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tators on the one hand, and a debatable modal theory on the other, may
have seemed to al-Farabi an uneven contest. But I suspect that al-Fara-
bi’s diffidence has a simpler explanation: he does not really believe that
God knows truths about future contingents. Indeed, he probably does
not believe that God knows truths about particulars at all, whether
past, present or future, at least not qua particulars.53 If this is right, then
the whole discussion of divine foreknowledge is motivated by an erron-
eous claim, which is that present statements about future contingents
must be exclusively true or false because God knows that they are true
or false. This is suggested by his repeated claim that the denial of fore-
knowledge is “very harmful” – harmful, but not necessarily false. If this
is al-Farabi’s attitude then in fact he is not (at least in this respect) fol-
lowing the commentators, because he knows that the ancients too wor-
ried about the problem of God’s foreknowledge – as witnessed by his
dim awareness of Alexander’s solution.54 The combination of ancient
and contemporary concern seems to have been sufficient to induce al-
Farabi to explain how God could know future contingents, if indeed He
does. But his real interest is to explain Aristotle’s intentions in De int 9,
and this is what he believes he has already done with the first solution.55
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